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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004).
LAW: The EPA has authority to stop construction of a major
pollutant emitting facility permitted by a state authority when it
finds that the authority's best available control technology is
unreasonable.
FACTS: The Clean Air Act's ("CAA") Prevention of Significant
Deterioration ("PSD") program was designed to ensure that the air
quality in "attainment areas" (areas that are already "clean") will
not degrade. The program bars construction of any major air
pollutant emitting facility not equipped with "the best available
control technology" ("BACT"). The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") has enforcement authority, when it finds that a
State is not complying with a CAA "requirement" governing
construction of a pollutant source, to pursue remedial action,
including "an order prohibiting construction." Because northwest
Alaska has been classified as an attainment area for nitrogen
dioxide, the PSD program applies to the emissions of that pollutant
in the region, requiring a permit to construct a facility emitting
said pollutant. A permit will not be issued unless the proposed
facility is subject to BACT for each CAA-regulated pollutant
emitted from the facility.
Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.
("Cominco") operated a zinc concentrate mine in northwest Alaska
and sought to expand its zinc production. Cominco applied to the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation ("ADEC") for
a PSD permit for its generators. ADEC preliminarily proposed as
BACT an emission control technology known as selective catalytic
reduction ("SCR"), which reduced emissions by 90%. Amending
its application, Cominco proposed, as BACT, an alternative
control technology, Low NOx, that achieves a 30% reduction in
pollutants. ADEC thereafter issued a first draft PSD permit
concluding that Low NOx was BACT for the generators. ADEC
identified SCR as the most stringent technology then technically
and economically feasible, but still endorsed Cominco's proffered
ADEC concluded that this
emissions-offsetting alternative.
proposal would achieve similar emission reduction results as SCR.
The EPA objected that ADEC had identified SCR as the BACT,
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but failed to require it as BACT. ADEC responded with a second
draft PSD permit, again finding Low NOx to be BACT. ADEC
further conceded that, lacking data from Cominco, it could make
no judgment as to SCR's impact on the mine's operation,
profitability, and competitiveness, but that it did impose a
"disproportionate cost" on the mine. In rejecting the EPA's
suggestion that ADEC include an analysis of SCR's adverse
economic impacts on Cominco, ADEC issued a final permit
approving Low NOx as BACT, citing SCR's adverse effect on the
mine's unique and continuing impact on the region's economic
diversity and the venture's "world competitiveness" as justification
for issuing the permit. The EPA then issued three orders to the
EPA prohibiting it from issuing a PSD permit to Cominco without
satisfactorily documenting why SCR was not BACT.
Additionally, the EPA prohibited Cominco from beginning
construction or modification activities at the mine. The Ninth
Circuit rejected challenges from ADEC and Cominco, holding that
the EPA had authority to determine the reasonableness or
adequacy of the State's justification for its BACT decision since
Cominco failed to demonstrate SCR's economic infeasibility and
ADEC failed to provide a reasoned justification for its elimination
of SCR as a control option.
ANALYSIS:
The Clean Air Act enumerates several
preconstruction requirements for the PSD program, including a
BACT determination.
Absent this determination, no major
emitting facility may be constructed. The CAA construction the
EPA advances in this litigation is consistent with prior interpretive
guides the Agency has several times published. "Only when a
state agency's BACT determination is 'not based on a reasoned
analysis' may EPA step in to ensure that the statutory requirements
are honored." Since the CAA itself does not specify a standard for
judicial review in this instance, the Court deferred to the default
standard in the APA of whether the action was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law." The Court hinged on the issue of whether ADEC's
BACT determination was reasonable. Since the EPA was willing
to consider "an appropriate record" by ADEC, supporting its
selection of NOx and detailing the adverse economic impacts upon
Cominco, the decision to issue prohibitory orders until such record
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was submitted was within the EPA's reasonable discretion in its
supervisory role over the state authority's BACT determinations.
HOLDING: The CAA authorized the EPA to stop construction of
a major pollutant emitting facility permitted by a state authority
when the EPA finds that an authority's BACT determination is
unreasonable. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was affirmed.
IMPACT: This is a very important ruling because it deals with
administrative law on both the state and federal levels. The Court
narrowed the discretion given to state agencies when making
BACT determinations. Because of this ruling, these state agencies
must now give detailed reports as to why a certain BACT was
chosen, including the economic and environmental impacts;
otherwise, the EPA will be able to circumvent any decision the
state agency makes as unreasonable and withhold the permit. On
the other hand, this decision afforded great discretion to the EPA
in determining the reasonableness of the actions by the state
agencies.
Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004).
LAW: Enforcement of a consent decree entered into by a state is
enforceable by a federal court.
FACTS: As a participant in the Medicaid program, Texas must
meet certain federal requirements, including that it have an Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment ("EPSDT")
program for children. The petitioners, mothers of children eligible
for EPSDT services in Texas, sought injunctive relief against state
agencies and various state officials, claiming that the Texas
program did not meet federal requirements. The claims against the
state agencies were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds,
but the state officials remained in the suit and entered into a
consent decree approved by the federal district court. In contrast
with the federal statute's brief and general mandate, the decree
required state officials to implement many specific proposals. Two
years later, when the petitioners filed an enforcement action, the
district court rejected the state officials' argument that the Eleventh
Amendment rendered the decree unenforceable, found violations
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of the decree, and directed the parties to submit proposals outlining
possible remedies. On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevented
enforcement of the decree because the violations of the decree did
not also constitute violations of the Medicaid Act. The issue
presented was whether enforcement of the consent decree would
violate the Eleventh Amendment by circumventing its protections
and undermining sovereign interests and accountability of state
governments.
ANALYSIS: The Court reasoned that enforcing the decree
vindicates an agreement that the state officials reached to comply
with federal law. Federal courts are not reduced to approving
consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, that
decree may be enforced. Further, if a detailed order is required to
ensure regulatory compliance with a decree for prospective relief
that in effect mandates the state to administer a significant federal
program, federalism principles require that state officials with
front-line responsibility for the program be given latitude and
substantial discretion. The federal court must ensure that when the
decree's objects have been attained, responsibility for discharging
the state's obligations is returned promptly to the state and its
officials. The basic obligations of federal law may remain the
same, but the precise manner of their discharge may not. If the
state establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should
make the necessary changes; otherwise, the decree should be
enforced according to its terms.
HOLDING: The judgment holding that the consent decree was
unenforceable against the state officials was reversed, and the case
was remanded for further proceedings.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court expanded the lower federal courts'
power to enforce consent decrees made by states to comply with
federal regulatory requirements.
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.
LLP, 124 S. Ct. 872 (2004).
LAW: When a telecommunications company refuses to deal with
its competitors, Sherman Act liability should only be imposed in
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exceptional circumstances, as the actions taken by the overseeing
regulatory agencies will generally be sufficient to deter such
conduct.
FACTS: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes upon an
incumbent local exchange carrier ("LEC") the obligation to share
its telephone network with competitors, including the duty to
provide access to individual network elements on an "unbundled"
basis. New entrants, so-called competitive LECs, combine and
resell these unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). Petitioner
Verizon Communications, Inc., the incumbent LEC in New York,
has signed interconnection agreements with rivals such as AT&T,
detailing the terms on which it will make its network elements
available. Part of Verizon's statutory UNE obligation is the
provision of access to operations support systems ("OSS"),
without which a rival cannot fill its customers' orders. Verizon's
interconnection agreement, approved by the New York Public
Service Commission ("PSC"), and its authorization to provide
long-distance service, approved by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), each specified the mechanics by which its
OSS obligation would be met.
When competitive LECs
complained that Verizon was violating that obligation, the PSC
and the FCC opened parallel investigations, which led to the
imposition of financial penalties, remediation measures, and
additional reporting requirements on Verizon. Respondent, a local
telephone service customer of AT&T, then filed this class action
alleging that Verizon had filled rivals' orders on a discriminatory
basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers
from becoming or remaining customers of competitive LECs in
violation of the Sherman Act. The District Court dismissed the
complaint, concluding that respondent's allegations of deficient
assistance to rivals failed to satisfy Sherman Act requirements.
The Second Circuit reinstated the antitrust claim. The issue
presented to the Supreme Court is whether Respondent's
complaint states a claim under the Sherman Act.
ANALYSIS: The activity of which respondent complains does
not violate pre-existing antitrust standards.
The Court
distinguishes the instant case from Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 427 U.S. 585 (1985), the leading case on
the issue of imposing antitrust liability for refusal to deal with
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competitors. The Court reasons that Aspen carves out a limited
exception, one in which the instant case does not fall. Because the
complaint does not allege that Verizon ever engaged in a voluntary
course of dealing with its rivals, its prior conduct sheds no light
upon whether its lapses from the legally compelled dealing were
anticompetitive. Further, Verizon's reluctance to interconnect at
the cost-based rate of compensation available under the statute is
uninformative with respect to any alleged monopolistic retail price.
Moreover, in Aspen, the defendant refused to provide its
competitor with a product it already sold at retail; whereas,
Verizon provides the unbundled elements to rivals under
These unbundled
compulsion and at considerable expense.
Court holds to
The
the
public.
to
elements are not even available
the general proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors.
When there exists a regulatory structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm, the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will
be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional
scrutiny. Since Verizon was subject to oversight by the FCC and
the PSC, both of which agencies responded to the OSS failure
raised in respondent's complaint by imposing fines and other
burdens on Verizon, there is no need to apply Sherman Act
requirements to this regime. To do so would create undue burdens
on the system and could chill the very conduct antitrust laws are
designed to protect.
HOLDING: Respondent's complaint alleging breach of an
incumbent LEC's 1996 Act duty to share its network with
competitors did not state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court confined the possible penalties
that could be imposed for a regulatory violation to those rendered
by the overseeing regulatory agency.
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Edwards, 124 S. Ct. 892
(2004).
LAW: An investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can
be an "investment contract" and thus a "security" subject to the
federal securities laws.
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FACTS: Edwards was the chairman, CEO and sole shareholder of
ETS Payphones, Inc., which sold payphones to the public via
independent distributors. The payphones were offered with an
agreement under which ETS leased back the payphone from the
purchaser for a fixed monthly payment, thereby giving purchasers
a fixed 14% annual return on their investment. Although ETS'
marketing materials trumpeted the "incomparable pay phone" as
"an exciting business opportunity," the payphones did not generate
enough revenue for ETS to make the payments required by the
leaseback agreements, so the company depended on funds from
new investors to meet its obligations. After ETS filed for
bankruptcy protection, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) brought a civil enforcement action, alleging that Edwards
and ETS had violated registration requirements and antifraud
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5 thereunder. The district
court concluded that the sale-and-leaseback arrangement was an
"investment contract" within the meaning of, and therefore subject
to, the federal securities laws. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding (1) that Eleventh Circuit precedent requires an
"investment contract" to offer either capital appreciation or a
participation in an enterprise's earnings, and thus exclude schemes
offering a fixed rate of return; and (2) those precedential opinions'
requirement that the return on the investment be derived solely
from the efforts of others was not satisfied when the purchasers
had a contractual entitlement to the return.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court had previously established that
the test for determining whether a particular scheme is an
investment contract is "whether the scheme involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others." The Court reasoned that this definition is
flexible, capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those seeking to use others' money on the
promise of profits. Therefore, there is no reason to distinguish
between promises of fixed return and promises of variable returns
for purposes of the test. In both cases, the investing public is
attracted by representations of investment income. Moreover,
investments pitched as low risk, offering a guaranteed fixed return,
are particularly more attractive to individuals who are more
vulnerable to investment fraud. In distinguishing between the
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types of return for the purposes of the test, such a reading of the
statute would allow for unscrupulous marketers of investments to
evade the securities laws by picking a rate of return to promise.
This interpretation would undermine the purposes of the laws. The
fact that investors have bargained for a return on their investment
does not preclude federal securities laws from governing.
HOLDING: The Eleventh Circuit erred in its holding that the
investment scheme fell outside the definition of "investment
contract" because purchasers had a contractual entitlement of
return. Such a holding was inconsistent with the Court's prior
precedent. Reversed and remanded.
IMPACT: The Court affirmed the SEC's prior treatment of
investment contracts and broadened the scope of protection that
securities laws afford investors.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Communities Against Runway Expansion. Inc. v. Fed. Aviation

Admin., 355 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
LAW: (1) The FAA has discretion to choose any contractor to
prepare an environmental impact statement, so long as the
objectivity and integrity of the process is not compromised. (2)
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is proper for the review of
an environmental justice analysis issued with an environmental
impact statement.
FACTS: Boston's Logan International Airport is consistently
ranked as one of the worst airports in the country with respect to
departure and arrival delays. Because of this ever-growing
problem, the Massachusetts Port Authority ("Massport") and the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") began investigating
different options to alleviate the congestion and delays. Massport
and the FAA initiated the environmental review process required
under federal and state laws to assess the impacts of different
options. Because the state and federal obligations were similar,
the two agencies agreed to prepare a joint environmental impact
statement ("EIS"). Massport contracted with the consulting firm
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of Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, Inc. to prepare the EIS. Massport
and the FAA subsequently issued a draft preliminary EIS for
public review and comment, which after addressing certain public
concerns was later amended and a final report was issued. The
final report endorsed what was called the "Preferred Alternative,"
which called for the construction of Runway 14/32 and the
Centerfield Taxiway, as well as improvements to certain existing
taxiways. The final environmental impact statement ("EIS")
predicted the Preferred Alternative would reduce delays by as
much as 28%, in addition to reducing the number of people
exposed to the highest levels of noise relative to other alternatives,
but would slightly increase that exposure under one potential
scenario. The FEIS also included an "environmental justice"
analysis ("EJA"), which concluded that any increase in significant
noise exposure would not be disproportionately borne by lowincome or minority populations. The FAA approved the Preferred
Alternative plan, determining that the project was reasonably
consistent with local land-use plans, and that fair consideration had
been given to the interests of local communities, as required by
law. Communities Against Runway Expansion ("CARE") filed a
petition for review of this decision and the City of Boston
("Boston") intervened in support of CARE. Massport intervened
in support of the FAA.
ANALYSIS: CARE argued on appeal that SH&E should not have
been selected as the contractor, as it had a potential conflict of
interest. The court determined that even if, arguendo, the FAA
failed to properly discharge its duties, CARE would not be entitled
to relief since any "error in the selection of the contractor 'did not
compromise the objectivity and integrity of the process."' Further,
CARE identified no conflict of interest that would disqualify
SH&E from preparing the EIS, nor is there evidence in the record
to support such a contention. Boston asserts on appeal that the
FAA's EJA is arbitrary and capricious because its choice of the
"comparison population" (the population of the potentially
affected area) is unreasonable. Boston argues that using Suffolk
County as the basis for comparison improperly biased the analysis
and that the greater Boston metropolitan area-Logan's "core
service area"-should have been used. Even though the EJA was
issued by the FAA pursuant to both an Executive Order and a
Department of Transportation Order, the court concluded that the
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FAA used its discretion to include the analysis in its report and
therefore the "arbitrary and capricious" standard should be applied.
Under this standard, the court determined that Boston's claim
failed on the merits, as the FAA's methodology was reasonable
and adequately explained. The FEIS sought to compare the
demographics of the population predicted to be affected by any
increased noise resulting from the project to the demographics of
the population that otherwise might conceivable by affected by
noise from the airport. It would be unreasonable to include the
entire metropolitan area because noise impacts are limited to the
vicinity of the airport.
HOLDING: The court concluded that (1) even assuming the
FAA erred in selecting the contractor who prepared the EIS, it was
not a ground for relief, and (2) the EJA included in EIS was not
arbitrary or capricious in failing to include the entire metropolitan
area.
IMPACT: This decision affirmed the broad discretion the FAA
possesses with respect to issuing environmental impact statements
and environmental justice analyses. So long as said reports are not
created in an arbitrary and capricious manner, they will be upheld.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Bobreski v. U.S. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003).
LAW: An ALJ does not have subpoena authority and the EPA
can bar its employees from testifying in administrative hearings, as
long as that denial is not arbitrary and capricious.
FACTS: Plaintiff Bobreski worked as a technician at Blue Plains
wastewater treatment facility ("Blue Plains"), which was run by
the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority ("WASA").
The plaintiff contacted the Washington Post to report alarming
deficiencies in Blue Plains' chlorine alarm system. The resulting
article prompted a visit from the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") inspector. The plaintiff lost his job, and subsequently
filed for federal whistleblower protection and won. After WASA
appealed the matter to an administrative law judge ("AL"), both
parties requested that the inspector testify, and the ALJ issued a
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subpoena for the testimony. The EPA refused to allow the
inspector to testify and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that such
refusal is a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").
ANALYSIS: The district court determined that because Congress
does not explicitly grant the Secretary of Labor subpoena authority
in the six statutes that make up the basis for plaintiffs
whistleblower claim, such power does not even impliedly exist.
Most of the six statutes contain some form of subpoena authority
listed elsewhere in the same legislation; therefore, Congress'
omission appears to be intentional. Further, the court reasoned
that since the EPA gave valid reasons for its refusal to let the
inspector testify, its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The
reasons EPA were in line with the express purpose of its Touhy
regulations, which set forth procedures when an EPA employee is
requested or subpoenaed to provide testimony concerning
information acquired in the course of performing official duties.
The EPA's reasoning included that allowing the inspector to testify
would (1) "be incongruent with the notion of impartiality as
contemplated by the regulation"; (2) have a potential cumulative
effect, where the EPA would find itself "caught in a morass of
actions"; (3) "thwart EPA's efforts to ensure that employees'
official time is used only for official purposes, as 'EPA simply
does not have sufficient personnel both to carry out its mission and
simultaneously allow testimony in the action"'; and (4) be
redundant in that the EPA already instructs "the inspector's
affidavit to provide an official record of his inspection and
subsequent findings regarding Blue Plains, giving the parties 'a
consistent record of [the] inspection activities."'
HOLDING: Because the EPA made a rational decision in
accordance with its Touhy regulations, the court determined that
the EPA's denial of the plaintiffs request for the inspector's
testimony was not arbitrary or capricious.
IMPACT: This decision prevents administrative agencies from
being burdened by time consuming litigation proceedings of third
party witnesses. So long as the agency's refusal to permit their
employees from testifying is not arbitrary and capricious, the
agency cannot be compelled to get involved.
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ALASKA STATE COURT

Raad v. State Comm'n for Human Rights. 2004 WL 103573
(Alaska. Jan. 9, 2004).
LAW: When a hearing examiner reviews the state's reasons for
not hiring someone, he must consider whether those reasons were
pretextual.
FACTS: Plaintiff teacher was a Muslim of Lebanese descent.
When she first applied to teach at a public school, she was
determined to be ineligible for a position because of a prior
disciplinary action. She later entered the administrative offices,
accused the district of discriminating against her, and allegedly
made threats. As a result, she was suspended from the applicant
pool. The teacher continued to apply for teaching positions, but
was not hired. She brought suit against defendant school district,
alleging violations of discrimination and unlawful retaliation. The
Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed her
complaint, and the Superior Court of the State of Alaska affirmed
the Commission's dismissal. The teacher appealed.
ANALYSIS:
The appellate court employed the three-part
McDonnell Douglas test to determine whether the teacher was the
subject of unlawful discrimination. The teacher was a member of
protected classes and she was at least minimally qualified for each
teaching position for which she applied. The appellate court
accepted that the teacher established a prima facie case and further
concluded that a review of the record confirmed that substantial
evidence justified the hearing examiner's conclusion that the
school district offered legitimate, non-discriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons for not hiring the teacher for twenty-eight
positions. The hearing examiner's conclusion that there was no
pretext, however, was problematic because it is not clear how he
analyzed the issue of pretext. Similarly, it is not clear what
evidence the hearing examiner considered relevant to the pretext
issue. The teacher identified instances permitting an inference that
some of the district's proffered reasons for not hiring her were
pretextual. Therefore, to the extent that that the hearing examiner
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found no evidence of pretext, the court determined that finding to
be erroneous.
HOLDING: Because there was some evidence of pretext, the
court reversed the decision and remanded the matter for further
proceedings.
IMPACT: This decision requires state employers to be able to
adequately justify their hiring decisions so as not to discriminate.
If there is any evidence of a pretext in that decision, the claim will
likely withstand a motion to dismiss.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT

Bonnell v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 82 P.3d 740 (2003).
LAW: Section 11521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") is unambiguous and allows a maximum 10-day stay for
agency review of a previously filed petition for reconsideration.
FACTS: The Attorney General, representing the Medical Board
of California ("the Board"), filed charges of gross negligence,
repeated negligent acts, and incompetence against Dr. Harry
Bonnell in connection with two autopsies he performed while
serving as chief deputy medical examiner for San Diego County.
At the hearing, the administrative law judge ("AL")
recommended that the Board's accusations be dismissed. The
Board subsequently adopted the AL's recommendation. Two
days before the effective date of the decision, the Attorney General
filed a petition for reconsideration. The next day, the Attorney
General filed a request pursuant to Government Code section
11521(a), part of the APA, for a stay of the Board's decision to
review the petition. The Board granted a 28-day stay solely for the
purpose of reviewing the petition. Bonnell then filed a petition for
writ of administrative mandate in the superior court. While that
petition was pending, the Board granted the Attorney General's
petition for reconsideration. The next day, the trial court issued an
alternative writ of mandate ordering the Board to set aside the stay
or to show cause why it should not be set aside. The trial court
found that section 11521(a) allowed the Board to grant only a
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maximum 10-day stay to review an already filed petition, and that
the Board's order for reconsideration was therefore void for lack of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed.
ANALYSIS:
The court refused to give deference to the
administrative agency's prior interpretation of § 11521(a) because
it is "clearly erroneous." Although the Board had previously
interpreted the statute to allow a maximum 30-day stay for
evaluating already filed petitions, the Supreme Court refused to
accord any deference to that reading of § 11521(a).
Since §
11521(a) is not a regulation promulgated by the Board, but a
legislative enactment applicable to a wide range of administrative
agencies, the court is less inclined to defer to an agency's
interpretation of the statute. The court found that § 11521(a) is
unambiguous and allows a maximum 10-day stay for agency
review of an already filed petition for reconsideration. As a result,
the Board's decision to order a reconsideration is void for lack of
jurisdiction.
HOLDING: Since the Board's decision was void for lack of
jurisdiction, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
IMPACT: This decision clears up any ambiguity in case law as to
the maximum stay period allowed by the APA. Further, it
reaffirms the notion that courts should only give deference to
agency interpretations of rules and statutes in which they have
particular expertise in interpreting.
FLORIDA STATE COURT

NAACP v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 863 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2003)
LAW: In order to satisfy the standing requirement to challenge a
rule change, an organization must show only that there would be a
substantial effect on a significant number of its members.
FACTS: The NAACP filed a rule challenge under Florida's
Administrative Code to amendments made concerning admissions
to the state university system. At issue was the certified question
of whether the NAACP has standing to challenge amendments
adopted by the Board of Regents and approved by the State Board
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of Education. These amendments were made in response to an
executive order of the governor that use of racial or gender
preference or quotas in admissions be prohibited. The NAACP
claimed that its membership included a large number of middle
school, high school and university students who would be affected
by the change in policy.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that since the NAACP correctly
asserted that a substantial number of its members were prospective
applicants to the state university system, and would be affected by
any change in policy concerning minority admissions, the NAACP
had standing. The only required showing was that on the rule
change would substantially affect a significant number of the
NAACP's members. Further, while not specifically identifying its
student members as current applicants to the university system, the
NAACP demonstrated a sufficient impact on its student members
as genuine prospective candidates for admission to meet the
requirement of substantial impact. The court found there to be an
obvious impact on NAACP's members that is different from the
impact of all citizens. The added "boost" that would be taken
away from minority students by changing the admission standards
and policies undeniably impacted minority students differently
than non-minority students and, thus, provides standing to the
NAACP.
The certified question was answered in the
HOLDING:
affirmative, and the court of appeals decision was quashed.
IMPACT: This decision somewhat relaxes the associational
standing requirement to challenge rule changes in Florida.
KENTUCKY STATE COURT

Rapier v. Philpot, 2004 WL 102199 (Ky).

LAW: Evidence gleaned from hearsay sources can be enough to
satisfy the substantial evidence test so long as it has an "indicia of
reliability" and there is a sound basis for the hearing officer's
decision.
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FACTS: Philpot had worked for the Tourism Development
Cabinet ("Tourism Cabinet") for several years prior to being
dismissed for misconduct related to his work. Because he was
classified as an employee with status, he could only be dismissed
for cause, according to Kentucky administrative law. Philpot
appealed his dismissal, and an administrative hearing was
conducted. Based on his findings that Philpot was guilty of
improper work performance, misuse of state property, lying to a
supervisor, poor management due to sexual relations with
subordinates, and improper use of a state vehicle, the hearing
officer concluded that Philpot violated a Kentucky statute. The
hearing officer recommended that Philpot be dismissed. The
Personnel Board adopted most of the hearing officer's
recommendations; Philpot subsequently appealed the Personnel
Board's final order. The Franklin Circuit Court dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that since Philpot did not
file exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended order, he had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Philpot appealed
this dismissal to the court of appeals, which held that filing
exceptions was not an administrative remedy and, therefore,
reversed the trial court.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court of Kentucky reasoned that
although the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
the dismissal was proper as there was no cognizable claim that the
employee could raise on judicial review. The filing of exceptions
was not a prerequisite to obtaining administrative review of a
hearing officer's recommended order. However, due to Philpot's
failure to file exceptions, Philpot could only raise on judicial
review those issues in the agency head's final order that differed
from those in the recommended order. As Philpot did not did not
seek judicial review of anything in the final order that differed
from the recommended order, there were no issues before the trial
court.
HOLDING: Because there were no issues before the trial court,
its dismissal was proper. The intermediate court is reversed.
IMPACT: This decision is important because it holds that filing
exceptions to a hearing officer's report is not an administrative
remedy and therefore does not have to be exhausted prior to
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appealing. However, if the petitioner fails to file exceptions at the
administrative hearing level, he has waived his right to appeal
those issues.

